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Examining the CDCynergy Event Assessment Tool: An Investigation of the Anthrax Crisis in
Boca Raton, Florida

Abstract
This study examines the dependability of the Event Assessment tool over time. The tool is part
of a CD-ROM, CDCynergy, distributed primarily to public information officers in the United
States by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The Event Assessment tool is designed
to aid emergency professionals in identifying the magnitude of a crisis event and provide
suggested actions appropriate to confronting an event. Applied two times during the emergence
of the anthrax bioterrorism crisis in Boca Raton, Florida, the tool operated in a binary manner by
first indicating a moderate crisis level and then four days later indicating a highly intense crisis,
suggesting that the Event Assessment tool is time sensitive. Additional limitations and
implications of the tool are discussed.
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Examining the CDCynergy Event Assessment Tool: An Investigation of the Anthrax Crisis in
Boca Raton, Florida

Less than one month after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, a Florida man was
diagnosed with inhalation anthrax. The diagnosis came from a Boca Raton doctor and was later
confirmed by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. At this time, health authorities at all
levels were reluctant to speculate that the source of the anthrax was anything but natural;
however, in the next two weeks the attitude in Florida and the rest of the United States would
change dramatically.
The public sought information they could trust as “the 2001 anthrax attacks brought
public health into the media spotlight in a way unmatched since the AIDS epidemic of the
1980s,” (Winett & Lawrence, 2005: p. 3). The agencies involved in the crisis were walking a fine
line between informing the public about a natural, albeit rare, strain of anthrax and avoiding an
overreaction by a terror sensitive public. The national media was very interested in the
uncommon disease contracted by the Florida native and questioned government health agencies
about the possibility of bioterrorism. Officials were steadfast in their responses and stated that
the anthrax case was unlikely an act of bioterrorism (Global News Wire, 2001). During the
unfolding of the anthrax crisis, authorities were shown to be incorrect in their public statements
on the facts of this case on a far too regular basis. As Blendon, Benson, Desroches and Weldon
(2003) warned, “To be effective in their communications, health officials need to know as the
crisis is unfolding what Americans believe, what they know and understand, whom they trust,
and what actions they are taking in response to the crisis (pp. 7-8). The communication errors
impugned the credibility of the agencies involved and kept a portion of the public at risk for
contracting anthrax.

Event Assessment Tool 4
The message errors started immediately with the first case of anthrax, which was initially
reported to be from natural sources and was unlikely an act of bioterrorism. Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Tommy Thompson went so far as stating, “There is no terrorism” (Kolata,
2001: p. 3). Then four days later, based on information from “patients, their families, the county
health director, the state epidemiologist, the CDC, the Miami medical care facility, and law
enforcement agencies”, the “event was characterized as a plausible bioterrorism event” (CDC,
2003). Eventually, the anthrax case surfaced as the CDC’s first bioterrorism crisis in the United
States (McClam, 2001).
Another illustration of poor communication with the public appeared when the anthrax
investigation moved into the local, south Florida post offices. The public’s concerns were
initially met with a variety of quotes from varying government agencies. A spokesperson for the
Postal Inspection Service in South Florida expressed skepticism that a letter sent to American
Media Incorporated was the carrier of anthrax. Concurrently, the FBI and the CDC were at the
Boca Raton post office briefing employees about anthrax and emphasizing to the press that the
briefing was extremely precautionary because the mail was not the confirmed carrier of the
anthrax (Canedy & Yardley, 2001). The CDC’s lead investigator Dr. Bradley Perkins was quoted
as saying “this is the stuff of extraordinary precaution to ensure the public’s safety” (Firestone,
2001: para. 7). The next day the post office was shut down as the previously mentioned letter
tested positive for anthrax. Five days later, the presence of anthrax was found and confirmed at
the Boca Raton post office (Firestone, 2001). Further communication miscues diminished public
trust in the authorities involved. Shore (2003) perhaps best captured this decline by noting,
The very public airing of medical errors has eroded the perception of health care’s
competence. During the anthrax crisis in fall 2001, changes in or poor communication
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about treatment recommendations and methods of testing for exposure had a similar
detrimental effect on the perception of the competence of public health agencies. The
trust cue of conscience, particularly critical to building trust, has been subjected to neardaily doses of accounts of fraud and abuse, conflicts of interest, disruptive behavior, and
other trust-busters . . . An additional challenge for establishing trust is the public’s
craving for consistency and consensus, particularly in times of crisis. Satisfying this
craving is always hard, given the ephemeral nature of some health recommendations.
Variability in health care recommendations during the anthrax attacks led to a caveat
emptor mentality perhaps most famously proclaimed in the quote, “In Cipro We Trust.”
(pp. 13-14)
The Crisis Assessment Tool
The CDC developed CD-ROM Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy offers
public information officers throughout the country a wide range of experience to draw from in a
public health crisis situation. The information presented in the CD-ROM provides a review of
crisis literature, standardizes crisis levels, presents the necessary terms to effectively
communicate between organizations, and indicates response actions based on expert experiences
and research. In essence, this CD-ROM works to raise the overall effectiveness of risk and crisis
communication for health and emergency professionals in the United States.
This study examines the CDC’s Event Assessment tool and its use in the Boca Raton
anthrax crisis. This tool, as a whole, is an extremely useful resource for health and other
emergency response organizations in all stages of risk and crisis communication and will serve
as a good foundation for developing specialized crisis plans and training programs for
organizations (Overland, personal communication, 2004). Unfortunately, during the Florida
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anthrax case, the tool was ineffective in helping the CDC determine the crisis intensity level and
resulted in a lack of preparation for the looming crisis.
The Event Assessment tool was developed to aid public health and other emergency
officials judge the seriousness of a crisis situation, detail the personnel and resources needed to
effectively confront a situation, and propose the frequency of public information statements. The
anthrax case and apparent failure of the Event Assessment tool provide an opportunity to
improve this particular crisis classification system. Specifically, this study concentrates on the
crisis levels that the Event Assessment tool arrives at during the unfolding of a crisis event.
There are four levels of crisis explained on the CD-ROM that are used to recommend
appropriate actions to confront a crisis event. The crisis levels range from A to D in descending
intensity (see Table 1). The instrument is composed of 24 criteria statements that may or may not

Insert Table 1 about here

describe the event being assessed. Officials using the tool read the event criteria and check those
that apply to the case. After users indicate whether the statement is applicable to their current
context, and based on the selections, the electronic wizard used predetermined intensity points to
calculate the crisis level. Based on the intensity level the assessed event achieves, the tool
recommends actions appropriate to the intensity of the situation (see Appendix 1 for complete
listing of values of each criteria statement).
The value of this study lies in determining if the Event Assessment tool functions
dependably over time. As a crisis situation evolves, the different statements in the tool may
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become applicable to the situation and in turn affect the crisis intensity rating. Thus, the response
recommendations would change as intensity grows.
The Context
Accurately determining intensity levels was imperative during the events that would
unfold in early October of 2001. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States of America was dealing with the loss of thousands of innocent lives, a national symbol,
and the assumed security of being geographically distant from terrorist organizations. When the
Twin Towers crashed to the ground in New York, many Americans were in a daze, not knowing
what to feel, but soon feelings of anger, blame, sorrow, and fear became common emotional
reactions (Greenberg, 2002). Citizens were concerned about further terrorist activities and were
sensitive to the emergence of exotic disease that may indicate a biological attack. Then the first
case of inhalation anthrax in 25 years appeared in the news (Global News Wire, 2001).
Health officials involved in the Boca Raton discovery of anthrax displayed caution in the
careful language they used when speaking to the press. The secretary of health and human
services said that the case appeared to be “isolated” and that there were no indications of a
“bioterrorist” attack (Global News Wire, 2001: para. 2). Authorities became involved in a
waiting game. If no other cases appeared soon, then the supposition of contraction by natural
causes would be supported. Unfortunately, a second case of anthrax was soon discovered and
America was once again faced with a horrendous act of terrorism. The FBI and CDC took over
the investigation and another media frenzy ensued.
Testing the Crisis Assessment Tool
The Event Assessment tool’s classification of the crisis intensity level and associated
response recommendations would have changed between the morning of October 4 (first case
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confirmed by the CDC) and October 8 (the second confirmed case). To understand these
differences, a timeline was constructed listing the events that unfolded around the discovery of
anthrax in Boca Raton, Florida (found in Table 2). The events preceding each of these dates were
used to complete the Event Assessment tool thus allowing a comparison of the recommendations
made at those times.

Insert Table 2 about here

This study applied the Event Assessment tool for the dates of October, 4 and October, 8
2001. The tool’s criteria statements were selected based on what was known about the situation
determined by an analysis of media reports in the Associated Press, The Boston Globe, and The
New York Times (see Table 2).
The interpretation of events by different users may lead to small variations in selecting or
not selecting some of the event criteria; however, these variations do not effect the overall crisis
level arrived at by the Event Assessment tool. To increase the crisis level, criteria statement one,
two or four must be selected (see Table 3).

Insert Table 3 here

Looking at the initial anthrax events, officials in Boca Raton had sufficient information to
legitimately complete the Event Assessment tool (see Appendix 1). Because only criteria
statement three applied, the intensity of the crisis could not be defined as highly intense. Because
items one, two or four were not selected, the CDC would argue that the event “is not a public
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health emergency requiring aggressive public communication” (CDC, 2003). Therefore, a less
intense response was warranted (see Appendix 2). An official or public information officer using
the tool at this time would likely not mobilize resources nor set up a 24 hour information center.
On October 8 officials again had sufficient information to use the Event Assessment tool;
however, at this time the tool would yield a very different response (see Appendix 3). As
additional statements became applicable to this case, the crisis level would have moved to level
A - a highly intense crisis (see Table 1). Once a crisis achieves the A level, the recommendations
do not change no matter how many intensity points are added. This crisis is already determined
to be at the most intense level. Below are the results given by the Event Assessment tool to
describe the event and offer appropriate actions.
Conclusions and Implications
The results arrived at for the October 4 instrument application would appear reasonable
with what was going on in the initial context of the anthrax crisis. The public and media attention
to the situation could be accounted for by the novelty of the first case of inhalation anthrax in 25
years. After all, the public was still reeling from the terrorist attacks of September 11, and
without any scientific connection to terrorism, the first case of inhalation anthrax could be
reasonably attributed to natural causes. However, the reasonability of the moderate crisis level
indication actually points to a flaw in the use of the tool. The result reflected the current
understanding of the situation, but did not allow for new understanding or interpretation of the
context.
Applying the instrument on October 8 yielded a much different response. The Event
Assessment tool pointed toward a serious situation that would require an immense amount of
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resources. Once again, the results were reasonable, but now health and other emergency agencies
were placed in a position of catching up.
The CDC faced harsh criticisms for their handling of the anthrax crisis by the media,
lawmakers, and the American public. The anthrax case was the first act of bioterrorism that the
CDC had to confront on the United States homeland. Dr. Alfred Sommer, dean of public health
at Johns Hopkins University stated, “The only people who can bring order to this is [sic] the
people like CDC . . . This is a national crisis. This should be their day” (McClam, 2001).
Based on the two completely different results given by the Event Assessment tool, a
reasonable conclusion would be that the crisis level is time sensitive. Public information officers
must reapply the tool as a situation matures to maintain an accurate perception of the situation.
The descriptive statements used to determine crisis level may become relevant or irrelevant over
time, which in turn, could result in the raising or lowering of a crisis level. During the first stages
of the anthrax outbreak, officials were trying desperately to move away from the idea that the
disease was caused by bioterrorism. The tool recommended a moderate response; however, “the
agency [CDC] was slow to alert doctors to the threat of other bioterror agents and didn’t do
enough to calm a jittery nation ill-informed on the particulars of anthrax” (McClam, 2001).
People were kept in harms way and officials communicated erroneous information to the public.
If a crisis level A was reached on October 4, when anthrax was confirmed, then a joint
information center would have been formed. This action could have prevented the post office,
CDC, and health officials from making erroneous statements that undermined the credibility of
the agencies involved. “From the beginning of the crisis, a lack of co-located spaces for the
different teams and a lack of technology were barriers to supporting the coordination of medical
and communication responses” (Robinson & Newstetter, 2003: p. 21). Spokespersons would not
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have been caught playing catch up with the media and public opinion. The public thought the
worst, and officials tried to calm the worries only to have these concerns become real. More
importantly, the crisis level would have shown investigators that this event required immediate
attention.
Instead of waiting, officials could have maintained focus on the event and started the
investigation days earlier. Subsequently, six people may have avoided exposure to inhalation
anthrax. Boca Raton had four days of warning between the first confirmed case and the second.
When the tool should have indicated the need for heightened awareness after the first case;
unfortunately, it did not, and the potential warning period was squandered by inaction.
The CDC uses the anthrax case in the CD-ROM to illustrate how the assessment tool
works; however, the case is assessed after the four days between the initial case and the
secondary case. Mirroring the testing done in this study, the crisis emerges as highly intense, but
the tool does not account for the four days with which this study has become concerned.
The CDC appears to have learned from the anthrax case that started in Boca Raton. A
document on the CD-ROM illustrates a portion of this learning.
The public must feel empowered in the event of a crisis to reduce the likelihood of
victimization and fear. How people absorb and act on information they receive during an
emergency may be vastly different from non-emergency situations. Studies have shown
however, that during an emergency, having more information leads to decreased anxiety.
(CDC, 2003: Step 3: Assess level of crisis)
Scholarly work in both emergency management and crisis communication repeat what the CDC
learned through trial and error (e.g., Seeger, Venette, Ulmer and Sellnow, 2002). When
considering the Florida anthrax case, “the CDC’s Dr. Rima Khabbaz, an infectious disease
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specialist, said the agency was ‘on a steep curve of learning’ and was re-evaluating its response”
(McClam, 2001). Unfortunately, learning resulted from tragic events, but future tragedies may be
averted due to the CDC’s expanded frame of reference. Julie Gerberding, the Director of the
CDC stated that CDCynergy “provides expert commentary by professionals who experienced the
anthrax crisis from a public health perspective” and offers “tools and templates to help you
respond quickly when every second counts” (CDC, 2003: Welcome).
The Event Assessment tool in this case operated in a binary manner. After the first
diagnosis, the tool indicated that the crisis was not highly intense, perhaps leading to reduced
vigilance on the part of the involved agencies. After the second case emerged, the tool
designated the event as being of the highest crisis intensity. Thus, the tool was ineffective in
allowing the organization to adequately prepare for intensification of events. Seeking improved
effectiveness after the anthrax crisis, CDC communication officers “advocated for improved
channels of communication among the different communication teams that produce information
and for educating the public to expect information to evolve as facts are uncovered” (Robinson
& Newstetter, 2003).
Also, to prevent this lack of preparation from reoccurring, the CDC needs to educate
officials about the use of the tool and its limitations. Education of officials should begin with
discussion of how the user’s perception of events has a significant impact on the tool’s result.
Officials, while likely never entirely objective, must be cautious when selecting criteria. Officials
should be willing to err on the side of being overly protective rather than erring on the side
underestimating a potentially serious event. Even though sometimes precautionary decision
making can cause more problems than it prevents, “the precautionary principle can serve as a
useful tool to stimulate discussions on ways to improve risk science and decisionmaking [sic]
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under uncertainty in order to proactively reduce risks while stimulating innovation in safer
processes and products” (Tickner and Gouveia-Vigeant, 2005).
In this study of the anthrax case, officials appeared to focus efforts on avoiding overreaction and public panic. However, their actions resulted in what they were trying to prevent.
The public, faced with conflicting and inaccurate information, abandoned its trust in public
health authorities and may have taken unwarranted precautions (Firestone, 2001a; Gray and
Ropeik, 2002; Shore, 2003). Coppola (2005) reminds readers that “in many cases of terrorism,
fear is the greatest emergency that must be managed, and irresponsible or inadequate attempts to
do so can actually increase public risk” (p. 32). Specifically addressing the anthrax case, Dr.
Gregg Wilkinson, chair of epidemiology at the University of North Texas’ school of public
health argued, “I think that there’s a bit of an overreaction on the part of many members of the
public. People are not using their heads . . . That’s where CDC and public health agencies need
to calm people’s fears” (McClam, 2001).
Second, the tool must point to potential crises and not just indicate the current crisis
level. The anthrax situation did intensify rapidly. Four days of lead time for this particular crisis
could have, at the very least, yielded a much more competent public image. Through a joint
information center, a spokesperson could have communicated a single message that other
authorities could refer to, increasing message consistency. Also, agencies speaking about matters
beyond their scope of expertise likely would have been reduced or eliminated with the creation
of a joint information center.
The extra lead time could have also been used to investigate American Media’s
employees and building. Testing employees for exposure while checking the building for
contamination would have assured the public that the matter was taken seriously, even as a
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precautionary measure. Findings could have indicated that the intensity of the situation was
escalating at this point, and the investigation could conceivably have been three full days ahead
of where it was.
To make what could have been done a reality, the Event Assessment tool must be able to
warn officials of potential crises and give appropriate recommendations. The tool should be
completed again as new information emerges. Users would first react to changes by selecting
those statements that apply given the new available information. Second, the user would select
appropriate statements based on a worst case scenario. In Boca Raton, one death from exposure
to anthrax may not have required a strong reaction, as the tool suggested. However, officials
should have determined their response based not only on the current situation, but also on the
probability of future events. They could have predicted the discovery of more cases and the
public’s reaction to learning that anthrax was possibly being spread through the mail.
The CDC’s efforts on this CD-ROM are astounding and this study should not be
perceived as an attempt to discredit any portion of the CD. This study has shown that the Event
Assessment tool is time sensitive, and should be used accordingly. This study also discusses
some possible solutions to this problem, in addition to, other issues concerning the Event
Assessment tool. The CDC’s Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy CD-ROM is a
valuable tool that should be continually refined as more is learned about crisis.
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Table 1 Descriptions of the crisis levels
Crisis level
Crisis description
Need to disseminate information rapidly to the public and
A
Highly intense in the media is crucial. Life and limb will be at risk if the public is
initial phase
not notified about the risk and public health recommendations.
Need to directly provide public health recommendations to
the public and media to save life or limb is not immediate. The
B
Intense
public and media, however, believe their health and safety are
or could soon be at risk. There is high and growing demand
for more information.
Media frenzy develops. Interest is generated because of the
event novelty versus a legitimate and widespread or immediate
C
Moderately intense
public health concern. Interest could die suddenly if a “real”
crisis occurred.
Builds slowly and may continue for weeks, depending on the
D
Minimally intense
outcome of further investigation. Requires monitoring
reassessments.
Taken from: Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy, 2003
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Table 2 Timeline of the anthrax crisis
Date
Information
A powder arrived in the Sun’s mailroom. The powder was in a letter
September 19 addressed to Jennifer Lopez and a Star of David was written on the
letter. Several people were said to have handled the letter.
October 1
Robert Stevens came home from his vacation in North Carolina.
Stevens had been feeling ill for a couple of days.
Stevens was admitted to the emergency room in Atlantis, Florida.
October 2
Dr. Larry Bush believed that Stevens contracted anthrax and notified
Palm Beach County Health Center.
Twelve members of the CDC started to investigate Steven’s
movements of the past few days. Spinal fluid samples are sent to the
October 3
CDC for analysis.
CDC confirmed that Stevens contracted anthrax. Stevens was admitted
to a hospital with non-contagious pulmonary anthrax.
October 4
Tommy Thompson, secretary of health and human services, told
reporters that the case is believed to be an isolated case, and there is no
evidence of terrorism.
October 5
Robert Stevens, 63 year-old, photo editor for The Sun, died at 4 p.m.
EDT.
FBI with CDC representatives took over the investigation after Ernesto
Blanco was found to have anthrax spores in his nasal cavity after being
hospitalized with flu-like symptoms.
October 8
Traces of Anthrax were found on Steven’s keyboard.
County Health Officials and FBI Investigators saw employees of
American Media. Employees were questioned, their nasal cavities were
swabbed for testing, and they were given Ciproflaxocin (antibiotic).
State and local health officials in New York sent an advisory on
October 10
bioterrorism disease information to all licensed doctors in New York
City.
CDC:
 Sent antibiotics for bacterial bioterrorist agents to New York
city.
 Stationed two epidemiologists at 12 hospitals in the area.
 Discovered that Stephanie Dailey was exposed to anthrax.
Dailey’s exposure was found through the nasal cavity swab test done
two days prior. Preliminary test results were received on 700 out of the
1,000 people tested, and only 1 has shown anthrax exposure.
Federal Officials announce they are now conducting a criminal
investigation.
Many of the already tested members of American Media took an
additional, optional blood test.
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Table 2 continued
CDC briefed Boca Raton postal employees about anthrax, and stressed
that the mail was not the confirmed carrier.
The New York Times confirmed the report of the letter addressed to
October 11
Jennifer Lopez with a bluish powdery substance.
Del Alvarez, a spokesman for the Postal Inspection Service in South
Florida, expressed skepticism that the letter was connected to the
anthrax outbreak and said that officials had not been able to locate it.
CDC tested 20 Boca Raton postal workers, and one mail distribution
center was shut down, and three area post offices were tested. 78
October 12
samples were sent to the CDC for testing.
FBI reported that 965 of the 1,000 American Media employee tests
were completed, and no more were found.
Five more American Media employees were shown to have exposure to
anthrax through the latter blood tests.
Investigators disclose that Erin O’Conner, an NBC employee in New
October 13
York City, was infected by a letter, and also confirmed a letter at a
Microsoft affiliate in Carson City, Nevada also tested positive for
anthrax.
Anthrax found in the main post office of Boca Raton.
October 15
Letter containing highly refined anthrax was opened in Senator
Daschle’s office.
(Canedy and Altman, 2001; Canedy and Kuczynski, 2001a; Canedy and Kuczynski, 2001b;
Canedy and Yardley, 2001; Daley and Kaplan, 2001; Firestone, 2001a; Firestone, 2001b;
Firestone, 2001c; Global News Wire, 2001; Kolata, 2001; Ojito, 2001; Powers, 2001; Wade,
2001; Yardley and Canedy, 2001)
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Table 3 The first four questions of the event assessment tool
Criteria number
Criteria
1
The timing of the initial event is an unexpected, legitimate,
public health emergency requiring swift and widespread
public education to prevent further morbidity and mortality
and empower the public (e.g., multistate e-coli outbreak or a
bioterrorism event).
2
Deaths are expected within a short window of time
(catastrophic event). Diagnosis and/or treatment are
uncertain.
3
The media and public perceive the event as the “first,”
“worst,” or “biggest,” etc.
4
Deaths are expected well above normal levels.
Taken from: Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy, 2003
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Appendix 1 The Event Assessment Matrix

Taken from: Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy, 2003
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Appendix 2 Event Assessment for October 4, 2001
October 4, 2001
Crisis
Level
C

Crisis Level Description
Moderately intense. Media frenzy
develops. Interest is generated
because of the event novelty versus
a legitimate and widespread or
immediate public health concern.
Interest could die suddenly if a “real”
crisis occurred.

Recommended
Communication Response
•

•

•

•

Selected
Criteria

Intensity
Points

Operate 10-12 hours a
day, 5-6 days a week
and assign a single
team member for afterhour purposes during
the initial phase.
Operate on weekend if
event occurs on a
weekend; otherwise use
on-call staff only on
weekends, not during
full operation.
Attempt to move the
media and public to
maintenance phases
with prescribed times
and outlets for updates.
No need to form a joint
information center.
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Event Criteria
1.

The timing of the initial event is an unexpected, legitimate,
public health emergency requiring swift and widespread
public education to prevent further morbidity and mortality
and empower the public (e.g., multistate e-coli outbreak or a
bioterrorism event).

2.

Deaths are expected within a short window of time
(catastrophic event). Diagnosis and/or treatment are
uncertain.

3.

The media and public perceive the event as the “first,”
“worst,” or “biggest,” etc.

4.

Deaths are expected well above normal levels.

5.

The event is occurring in a metropolitan area (with dense
media outlets) versus a sparsely populated area (with fewer
media outlets).

6.

The event is sudden, is national in scope, or has the
potential to have a national health impact.

7.

The government is perceived as a cause of or responsible for
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the event.
8.

The event predominantly impacts children or previously
healthy adults.

9.

The event is possibly “man-made” and/or deliberate.

10.

Controlling the event will require a suspension of civil rights
for a significant portion of the population.

11.

Persons involved in the event must take active steps to
protect their personal health and safety.

12.

Responsibility for mitigating the event falls within the scope
of your organization.

13.

The event has some “exotic” aspect.

14.

A well-known product, service, or industry is involved.

15.

Sensitive international trade or political relations are
involved.

16.

A well-known “celebrity” is involved.

17.

An ongoing criminal investigation is involved.

18.

The disease or public health emergency, disaster, or crisis is
not well understood by the general population, or the
general population is misinformed about the situation.

19.

The event is “acute.” The event occurred and your
organization is faced with explaining the event and the
aftermath (e.g., an accident in the laboratory or a chemical
release).

20.

The long-term health effects for humans involved in the
event are uncertain.

21.

The event is evolving. Its progression is uncertain and may
become more or less serious (e.g., identification of a novel
influenza virus).

22.

The event site does not have a well-equipped and resourced
public information response capability.

23.

The event occurred internationally with little chance of
affecting the U.S. population.

24.

Treatment or control of exposure is generally understood
and within the person’s control.

Taken from: Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy, 2003
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Appendix 3 Event Assessment for October 8, 2001
October 8, 2001
Crisis
Level
A

Crisis Level Description
Highly intense in the initial phase.
Need to disseminate information
rapidly to the public and media is
critical. Life and limb will be at risk if
the public is not notified about the risk
and public health recommendations.

Recommended
Communication Response
•

•

Selected
Criteria

Intensity
Points

Operate 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week for
media and public
response, with an
expectation that relief
and replacement staff
will be needed.
Per your plan, form or
join a joint information
center (JIC).
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Event Criteria
1.

The timing of the initial event is an unexpected, legitimate,
public health emergency requiring swift and widespread
public education to prevent further morbidity and mortality
and empower the public (e.g., multistate e-coli outbreak or a
bioterrorism event).

2.

Deaths are expected within a short window of time
(catastrophic event). Diagnosis and/or treatment are
uncertain.

3.

The media and public perceive the event as the “first,”
“worst,” or “biggest,” etc.

4.

Deaths are expected well above normal levels.

5.

The event is occurring in a metropolitan area (with dense
media outlets) versus a sparsely populated area (with fewer
media outlets).

6.

The event is sudden, is national in scope, or has the
potential to have a national health impact.

7.

The government is perceived as a cause of or responsible for
the event.

8.

The event predominantly impacts children or previously
healthy adults.

9.

The event is possibly “man-made” and/or deliberate.

10.

Controlling the event will require a suspension of civil rights
for a significant portion of the population.

11.

Persons involved in the event must take active steps to
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protect their personal health and safety.
12.

Responsibility for mitigating the event falls within the scope
of your organization.

13.

The event has some “exotic” aspect.

14.

A well-known product, service, or industry is involved.

15.

Sensitive international trade or political relations are
involved.

16.

A well-known “celebrity” is involved.

17.

An ongoing criminal investigation is involved.

18.

The disease or public health emergency, disaster, or crisis is
not well understood by the general population, or the
general population is misinformed about the situation.

19.

The event is “acute.” The event occurred and your
organization is faced with explaining the event and the
aftermath (e.g., an accident in the laboratory or a chemical
release).

20.

The long-term health effects for humans involved in the
event are uncertain.

21.

The event is evolving. Its progression is uncertain and may
become more or less serious (e.g., identification of a novel
influenza virus).

22.

The event site does not have a well-equipped and resourced
public information response capability.

23.

The event occurred internationally with little chance of
affecting the U.S. population.

24.

Treatment or control of exposure is generally understood
and within the person’s control.

Taken from: Emergency Risk Communication CDCynergy, 2003

